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1 Introduction
The literature on horizontal mergers is roughly divided into two categories. The ¯rst deals with
the pro¯t e®ects of mergers. Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) examine
whether mergers are bene¯cial with regard to the pro¯ts of the participants in a quantity or price
setting game, respectively. The second category deals with the welfare e®ects of mergers. In
particular, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) indicate that mergers may have welfare-improving e®ects
by redistributing production from less e±cient to more e±cient ¯rms.
On the other hand, except for B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2003), there exist few studies on
the decision to merge by public and private ¯rms in a mixed oligopoly. They explore the case
in which a public and a private ¯rm merge into a multiproduct ¯rm and show that both ¯rms
want to merge when the shareholding ratio of the owner of the public ¯rm takes an intermediate
value and the substitutability of the goods produced by both the public and private ¯rms is
su±ciently low.
In contrast, they ignore the case where mergers improve production e±ciency. Several reasons
exist why mergers may lead to an improvement of productivity. One is the \learning e®ect," in
which a partner to the merger learns from the other partner's patents, management expertise, etc.
Despite assuming that there are economies of scale,1 B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2003) disregard
this improvement of productivity. However, if ¯rms combine some form of \capital" between
their facilities after a merger, it certainly results in improving productivity of the merged ¯rm
when economies of scale exist. There are no existing studies on productivity-improving mergers
in the context of a mixed oligopoly. This study aims to ¯ll this gap and have an impact on
the subject. For this purpose, we investigate the productivity-improving merger as considered
in McAfee and Williams (1992) under the assumption that ¯rms have identical technologies
represented by the quadratic cost function.
In our model, there exist one public ¯rm and n identical private ¯rms in a market for a
homogeneous good; this is in contrast to B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2003), who explore a mixed
duopoly in a di®erentiated market. We show that if a merger improves productivity, both a
public and a private ¯rm want to merge when the shareholding ratio of the owner of the public
¯rm takes an intermediate value after the merger, even though there exist only a few private
¯rms in the market. In addition, we ¯nd that if the number of private ¯rms is su±ciently large,
the owner of the public ¯rm is always willing to merge whenever its shareholding ratio in the
merged ¯rm is lower than a critical value.
This paper has four sections and an Appendix. Section 2 sets up the model. We refer to
McAfee and Williams (1992) for the cost function of the merged ¯rm.2 In Section 3, we explore
the problem of a merger between a public ¯rm and a single private ¯rm. Our purpose here is to
analyze whether the public and the private ¯rm want to merge, when the merger has an e®ect of
improving the productivity. Section 4 provides the conclusion. In the Appendix, we investigate
in detail the case of a merger without any improvement in production.
1They assume that ¯rms have identical technologies represented by the quadratic cost function.
2They assume that the total cost of ¯rm i (i = 1; : : : ; n) is equal to (qi)
2=2ki, where ki is the ¯rm's capital
stock. In addition, we assume that the capital stock of each ¯rm is normalized to 1, i.e., k0 = k1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = kn = 1.
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2 The model
We consider a mixed market in which (n + 1) ¯rms produce a homogeneous good. One of the
¯rms is a welfare-maximizing public ¯rm (denoted by ¯rm 0), and the others are symmetric
pro¯t-maximizing private ¯rms (denoted by ¯rm 1, ¯rm 2, ¢ ¢ ¢ , and ¯rm n). We assume the
following linear inverse demand function:
P (Q) = a¡Q a > 0;
where Q is the total output of the good. Each ¯rm produces the good using identical technology,
and the cost function of ¯rm i is given by
Ci(qi) = (qi)2 i = 0; 1; : : : ; n;
where qi (i = 0; 1; : : : ; n) is the output of each ¯rm. The pro¯t of ¯rm i is expressed as
¼i = P (Q)¡ Ci(qi) = (a¡Q)qi ¡ (qi)2 i = 0; 1; : : : ; n: (1)
Each private ¯rm chooses its output level in order to maximize (1). On the other hand, the
public ¯rm chooses its output to maximize social welfare. Social welfare is represented by the
sum of consumer surplus (denoted by CS) and pro¯ts of all ¯rms as follows:
W = CS +
nX
i = 0
¼i; (2)
where CS =
Z Q
0
P (z)dz ¡ P (Q)Q = 1
2
Q2:
We assume that the public ¯rm and one of the private ¯rms decide whether to merge and set
up a multiplant ¯rm whose ownership is shared by the owners of the public and private ¯rms.
For simplicity, we describe the owner of the public ¯rm after the merger as \the public sector"
and one of the private ¯rms as \the private sector." Since the private ¯rms are symmetric, we
assume that ¯rm 1 can merge with the public ¯rm without loss of generality. We consider that
the merged ¯rm (denoted by ¯rm m) has two plants, one of which is owned by the public ¯rm
and the other by the private ¯rm before the merger. Thus, the merged ¯rm can produce the
good at lower cost than the other ¯rms. The cost function of the merged ¯rm is given by3
Cm(qm) =
1
2
(qm)2;
where qm is the output of the merged ¯rm. The pro¯t of the ¯rm is expressed as
¼m = (a¡Q)qm ¡ 12(qm)
2:
Note that the total number of ¯rms is reduced from (n+ 1) to n by the merger.
3The merged ¯rm may be regarded as a multiplant ¯rm, operating the two former ¯rms as \plants." In this
paper, we assume that a (multiplant) merged ¯rm operates under a situation in which both plants perform most
e±ciently (see McAfee and Williams, 1992). We assume that the productivity of the public and private ¯rms is
symmetric, i.e., the cost function of each ¯rm is represented by the quadratic form of its own output. Therefore,
a merged ¯rm has technology that is twice as e±cient as that of the two pre-merger ¯rms.
2
The public and private sectors share the ownership of the merged ¯rm. Let ® 2 [0; 1] denote
the shareholding ratio of the public sector and let the merged ¯rm choose its output qm to
maximize the weighted average of social welfare and its own pro¯t as in Matsumura (1998).
This objective function is given by
V = ®W + (1¡ ®)¼m: (3)
Since the total number of the ¯rms is reduced by the merger, social welfare is as follows:
W = CS +
nX
k = 2
¼k + ¼m:
The pro¯t of the merged ¯rm is distributed according to the shareholding ratio. Thus, we
assume that the private sector receives pro¯t at the rate of (1¡ ®).
Assumption 1. The payo® of the private sector that partially owns the merged ¯rm is (1¡®)¼m.
When social welfare improves and the pro¯t received by the private sector increases as the result
of the merger, the public and the private ¯rm merge.
We consider a two-stage game: In the ¯rst stage, both the public and the private ¯rm decide
whether to merge. In the second stage, each ¯rm chooses its own output level.
3 The decision by ¯rms to merge
We consider the following two cases: First, the ¯rms do not merge, resulting in the case of a
mixed oligopoly in which one public ¯rm and n private ¯rms compete. We denote this case as
N (No merger). Second, the ¯rms merge; this case is denoted as M (Merger).
We ¯rst examine the second stage of the game in case N . As stated in the previous section,
the public ¯rm chooses q0 to maximize (2), while the private ¯rm j chooses qj to maximize
(1) (j = 1; : : : ; n). Solving these maximization problems simultaneously, we obtain the Nash
equilibrium in the second stage:
qN0 =
3a
9 + 2n
; qNj =
2a
9 + 2n
; ¼N0 =
9a2
(9 + 2n)2
; ¼Nj =
8a2
(9 + 2n)2
;
CSN =
a2(3 + 2n)2
2(9 + 2n)2
; WN =
a2(27 + 28n+ 4n2)
2(9 + 2n)2
; j = 1; : : : ; n:
The output of the public ¯rm is larger than that of each private ¯rm regardless of the number
of private ¯rms, n. Consumer surplus and social welfare are increasing functions of n, while the
pro¯t of each ¯rm is a decreasing function of n.
When the public ¯rm (¯rm 0) and the private ¯rm (¯rm 1) merge, they set up a multiplant
¯rm that chooses qm to maximize (3). The other ¯rms choose their output level to maximize
(1). As a result, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in the second stage:
qMk =
a(2¡ ®)
7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n) ; q
M
m =
3a
7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n) ;
¼Mk =
2a2(2¡ ®)2
[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ; ¼
M
m =
9a2(3¡ 2®)
[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ;
3
CSM =
a2[1 + ®+ (2¡ ®)n]2
2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ;
WM =
a2(2¡ ®)(6 + 10n+ 2n2 + 3®¡ 2n®¡ n2®)
2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ; k = 2; : : : ; n:
The output of the merged ¯rm is larger than that of each private ¯rm irrespective of n and
®. In addition, consumer surplus and social welfare are increasing functions of n, while social
welfare decreases as ® increases when the value of ® is su±ciently high.4 The rise of ® widens
the output gap between each private ¯rm and the merged ¯rm. Although the productivity-
improving merger enhances social welfare within the bounds of low ®, the widening gap reduces
social welfare because of the convexity of the cost function when ® is su±ciently high. In
addition, when the market is a monopoly after the merger (n = 1), social welfare is maximized
at ® = 1.
Next, we analyze both the public and private ¯rm's incentives to merge in the ¯rst stage of
the game. First, we examine whether the public ¯rm wishes to merge with the private ¯rm. Since
the public ¯rm aims at maximizing social welfare, it has an incentive to merge if WM > WN .
Let ®¤0 and ®¤¤0 denote the values of ® such that WM =WN :
®¤0 =
378 + 122n+ 4n2 + 3(9 + 2n)
p
27¡ 2n+ 2n2
351 + 166n+ 14n2
;
®¤¤0 =
378 + 122n+ 4n2 ¡ 3(9 + 2n)p27¡ 2n+ 2n2
351 + 166n+ 14n2
:
We obtain the following proposition using ®¤0 and ®¤¤0 .
Proposition 1. WM > WN if and only if ®¤¤0 < ® < ®¤0.
Proof. Subtracting WN from WM , we obtain the following equation:
WM ¡WN = ¡a
2[(351 + 166n+ 14n2)®2 ¡ (756 + 244n+ 8n2)®+ 351 + 76n¡ 4n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. Since this numerator is a quadratic concave
function of ® and is equal to zero when ® = ®¤0 or ® = ®¤¤0 , WM > WN if and only if
®¤¤0 < ® < ®¤0.
This proposition shows that if the number of private ¯rms is greater than or equal to 6
(n ¸ 6), the public ¯rm does not want to merge at ® = 1, since ®¤0jn = 6 < 1 and ®¤0 is a
decreasing function of n. In addition, when the number is greater than or equal to 23 (n ¸ 23),
the public ¯rm wants to merge at ® = 0, because ®¤¤0 jn = 23 < 0 and ®¤¤0 is a decreasing function
of n. In other words, even if the public sector does not have a share of the merged ¯rm, the public
¯rm has an incentive to merge in n ¸ 23. Figure 1 illustrates this incentive in relation with
parameters n and ®. The shaded area represents the range in which the public ¯rm wants to
merge. This range broadens as n increases until n = n^, but when n > n^, it narrows conversely.5
4Since @W
M
@®
= 3a
2[8+n¡®(7+2n)]
[7+2n¡®(2+n)]3 , W
M decreases as ® rises when ® > 8+n
7+2n
. In addition, 8+n
7+2n
is a decreasing
function of n.
5More precisely, the critical value is n^ = (19 + 2
p
178)=2 ¼ 22:8417.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 1
The increase in the number of private ¯rms reduces the public ¯rm's contribution to consumer
surplus, but the output gap between the public and private ¯rms remains. Since the gap
decreases social welfare, the increase enhances the public ¯rm's incentive to merge. Thus,
the shaded area widens as n increases. This logic coincides with that of De Fraja and Delbono
(1989), who show that the privatization of a public ¯rm can improve social welfare.
However, Proposition 1 depends heavily on our assumption that the merger improves the
productivity of the ¯rm. If we do not assume this e®ect, the public ¯rm will not wish to merge
with the private ¯rm regardless of the number of private ¯rms (see Appendix).
Next, we consider whether the private ¯rm (¯rm 1) decides to merge with the public ¯rm.
By Assumption 1, the private ¯rm decides to merge if (1¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 . Let ®¤1 and ®¤¤1 denote
the values of ® such that (1¡ ®)¼Mm = ¼N1 :
®¤1 =
3197 + 1268n+ 116n2 + 3(9 + 2n)
p
3289 + 1156n+ 100n2
2(1394 + 584n+ 56n2)
;
®¤¤1 =
3197 + 1268n+ 116n2 ¡ 3(9 + 2n)p3289 + 1156n+ 100n2
2(1394 + 584n+ 56n2)
:
We obtain the following proposition using these equations.
Proposition 2. (1¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 if and only if ® < ®¤¤1 .
Proof. Subtracting ¼N1 from (1¡ ®)¼Mm , we obtain the following equation:
(1¡®)¼Mm¡¼N1 =
a2[(1394 + 584n+ 56n2)®2 ¡ (3197 + 1268n+ 116n2)®+ 1403 + 524n+ 44n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. Since this numerator is a quadratic convex
function of ® and is equal to zero when ® = ®¤1 or ® = ®¤¤1 , (1 ¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 if ® > ®¤1 or
® < ®¤¤1 . However, ®¤1 > 1 for all n, and thus the constraint of ® 2 [0; 1] is violated. Therefore,
(1¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 if and only if ® < ®¤¤1 .
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2. Since the increase in the number of private ¯rms
reduces the market price and the increment of pro¯t by the merger, the private ¯rm demands a
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Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2
higher pro¯t distribution ratio to compensate the pro¯t reduction. Therefore, ®¤¤1 is a decreasing
function of n (in other words, (1¡®¤¤1 ) is an increasing function of n). Note that limn!1 ®¤¤1 =
1=2; thus, the private ¯rm always decides to merge irrespective of n when the shareholding ratio
of the private sector is more than 1=2.
We present the following lemma in which we compare ®¤¤1 with ®¤0 and ®¤¤0 to determine
whether the public and private ¯rms merge.
Lemma 1. ®¤0 > ®¤¤1 for n 2 [1;1) and ®¤¤0 > ®¤¤1 at n = 1, but there exists ~n 2 (1;1) such
that ®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 for n ¸ ~n.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the number of private ¯rms is su±ciently small, ®¤¤0 is greater than ®¤¤1 . However,
when the number exceeds the critical value ~n, this relation is reversed (®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 ). We obtain
an approximate value of n such that ®¤¤0 = ®¤¤1 is 1.9907, i.e., the ¯rms do not merge in mixed
\duopoly." This coincides with the result of B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2003).6 By Propositions
1 and 2 and Lemma 1,7 we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The public ¯rm 0 and the private ¯rm 1 will merge when ®¤¤0 < ® < ®¤¤1 .
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 3. If n 2 (~n; n^), the area in which both the public and private
¯rm want to merge broadens as n increases.8 In addition, when n is larger than n^, both ¯rms
want to merge even if the merged ¯rm is owned only by the private sector (viz., ® = 0). This
is because the welfare loss due to the excess production of the public ¯rm is larger than the
welfare improvement as a result of increasing consumer surplus as stated above.
6B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2003) do not consider the productivity-improving merger. However, even if the
merger improves the productivity of the merged ¯rm, the ¯rms do not merge in a mixed duopoly with a homo-
geneous good.
7Lemma 1 guarantees the existence of the range in which ® 2 (®¤¤0 ; ®¤¤1 ).
8However, in n ¸ n^, ®¤¤0 is less than 0, and the area narrows as n increases by the constraint of ® ¸ 0.
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Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 3
4 Conclusion
This paper investigated how a public and private ¯rm's decision whether to merge depends on
the shareholding ratio and the number of private ¯rms. We showed that when the shareholding
ratio of the public sector is ® 2 (®¤¤0 ; ®¤¤1 ), which is achieved in n > ~n, both ¯rms decide to
merge. Note that the number of private ¯rms is not less than two when the merger is achieved.
B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2003) demonstrate that the ¯rms do not merge in a mixed duopoly
with a homogeneous good. However, we proved that if mergers improve the e±ciency of the
¯rms and the number of private ¯rms is su±ciently large, the result is not necessarily the same
as theirs. In particular, the productivity-improving merger is critical to the result. If we do not
assume this e®ect, the public ¯rm does not choose to merge regardless of the number of private
¯rms.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on mixed oligopoly by showing that a public ¯rm
may have an incentive to merge with a private ¯rm in a homogeneous market. However, the
analysis of mergers in a mixed market suggests subjects for future research. One is the situation
in which the public ¯rm merges with multiple private ¯rms, and another is where there exist
foreign shareholders of the private ¯rms. Since it would appear that these situations would have
an impact on the ¯rms' decision to merge, the investigation of these situations is important for
studies of mergers in mixed markets.
Appendix
The public ¯rm's decision without productivity improvement
We show that the public ¯rm does not have an incentive to merge with the private ¯rm in the
case where the merger does not improve the productivity of the merged ¯rm. In this case, social
welfare before and after the merger is as follows:
WN =
a2(27 + 28n+ 4n2)
2(9 + 2n)2
;
7
WM =
a2[36n+ 9n2 + (6¡ 18n¡ 6n2)®¡ (3¡ 2n¡ n2)®2]
2[9 + 3n¡ (2 + n)®]2 :
Subtracting WN from WM , we examine the public ¯rm's incentive to merge with the private
¯rm.
WM ¡WN = ¡a
2[(351 + 166n+ 14n2)®2 ¡ (1458 + 576n+ 36n2)®+ 2187 + 810n+ 54n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[9 + 3n¡ (2 + n)®]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. This numerator is a quadratic concave
function of ® and the discriminant of this quadratic equation, D, is9
D = ¡432(9 + 2n)2(27 + 14n+ n2) < 0:
Thus, for all n, WN is larger than WM and the public ¯rm does not want to merge.
Proof of Lemma 1
We divide this proof into three steps.
First, we prove that ®¤0 > ®¤¤1 for n 2 [1;1). Evaluating ®¤0 and ®¤¤1 at n = 1, then
®¤0jn = 1 =
56 + 11
p
3
59
¼ 1:2721 > 0:5792 ¼ 509¡ 11
p
505
452
= ®¤¤1 jn = 1:
Using computer software, we obtain
lim
n!1®
¤
0 =
2 + 3
p
2
7
¼ 0:8918 > ®¤¤1 jn = 1:
Since, in addition to this, ®¤0 and ®¤¤1 are decreasing functions of n, we obtain ®¤0 > ®¤¤1 for
n 2 [1;1).
Second, we prove that ®¤¤0 > ®¤¤1 at n = 1. Evaluating ®¤¤0 at n = 1, we obtain
®¤¤0 jn = 1 =
56¡ 11p3
59
¼ 0:6262:
Therefore, ®¤¤0 jn = 1 > ®¤¤1 jn = 1.
Finally, we prove that there exists ~n 2 (1;1) such that ®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 for n ¸ ~n. As mentioned
in Section 3, both ®¤¤0 and ®¤¤1 are decreasing functions of n. In addition, we obtain the following
limit relations:
lim
n!1®
¤¤
0 =
2¡ 3p2
7
¼ ¡0:3204 < 0:5 = lim
n!1®
¤¤
1 :
Considering ®¤¤0 jn = 1 > ®¤¤1 jn = 1, there exists ~n > 1 such that ®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 for n ¸ ~n.
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